Abstract-In proxy re-encryption, a proxy can transform a ciphertext computed under Alice's public key into one that can be opened under Bob's decryption key. In 2007, Matsuo proposed the concept of four types of proxy re-encryption schemes: CBE(Certificate Based Public Key Encryption) to IBE(Identity Based Encryption)(type 1), IBE to IBE(type 2), IBE to CBE (type 3), CBE to CBE (type 4). We observe that the proxy re-encryption from CBE to IBE scheme in Matsuo's scheme inherits the key escrow problem from IBE. Is this necessary for proxy re-encryption from CBE to IBE? We give a negative answer. If we emphasis on the PKG's involving in the re-encryption key generation, some interesting results can be obtained. We propose the concept of hybrid proxy re-encryption without key escrow, give the new security model for this primitive, construct such a scheme and prove its security. Furthermore, we construct the first proxy re-encryption scheme from from IBE to CBE, giving the security model for this new primitive and prove its security. At last, we compare our schemes with other related schemes, the results show that our schemes can have high level security with good efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss introduced the concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE) [2] . The goal of proxy re-encryption is to securely enable the re-encryption of ciphertexts from one key to another, without relying on trusted parties. In 2005, Ateniese et al proposed a few new PRE schemes and discussed its several potential applications such as e-mail forwarding, law enforcement, cryptographic operations on storage-limited devices, distributed secure file systems and outsourced filtering of encrypted spam [1] . Since then, many excellent schemes have been proposed [4] - [6] , [9] - [11] . In ACNS'07, Green et al. proposed the first identity based proxy re-encryption schemes(IDPRE) [6] . In ISC'07, Chu et al. proposed the first IND-ID-CCA2 IDPRE schemes in the standard model, they constructed their scheme based on Water's IBE. But unfortunately Shao et 
al. found a flaw in their
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A. Main Motivation and Contribution
In Pairing'07, Matsuo proposed another few more PRE schemes in identity based setting [10] . Interestingly, they proposed the concept of four types of PRE: CBE(Certificate Based Public Key Encryption)
1 IBE (Identity Based Encryption)(type 1), IBE to IBE (type 2), IBE to CBE (type 3), CBE to CBE (type 4) [10] , which can help the ciphertext [8] , [14] circulate smoothly in the network. They constructed two PRE schemes: one is the hybrid PRE from CBE to IBE, the other is the PRE from IBE to IBE.
We think enabling the different types of ciphertext circulate smoothly in the network is very important for the cloud application and ubiquitous computation, especially considering the new encryption paradigm: functional encryption will come at age in the near future. It is not strange one day you will meet the ciphertexts constructed by attribute-based encryption, hidden-vector encryption, predicate-based encryption, identity based encryption, public key encryption and others. Finding a mechanism which can handle these ciphertext smoothly while not giving many changes to the existing information system will be an important task for the engineries. Until now although many cryptographic protocols have been proposed, but it seems that the only proper solution is hybrid proxy re-encryption for this situation, which can achieve some balance between security and easily useable.
We extend Matsuo's research on PRE in identity based setting [10] . We observe that: proxy re-encryption from CBE to IBE scheme in [10] inherits the key escrow problem from IBE. That is, PKG can decrypt every reencrypted ciphertext for IBE users.
For example, scientist Alice with public/private key pair (sk A , pk A ) might want to exploit an PRE from CBE to IBE so that messages encrypted under her public key can be "automatically" converted into ciphertext for her assistant Bob under his identifier. Bob's company sets up an IBE system where Manager Malice plays the role of PKG for secure communication. If Alice and Bob adapt Matsuo's PRE from CBE to IBE, Malice can read every re-encrypted ciphertext for Bob. This is intolerable.
To solve this problem, we propose the concept of hybrid proxy re-encryption from IBE to CBE without key escrow. We detail our main contributions as following:
1) Like the idea in certificateless public encryption, we propose the concept of hybrid proxy re-encryption from IBE to CBE without key escrow, elaborate the security model and construct such a scheme. The security model for this new primitive is complex for it introducing a new adversary PKG. 2) We construct a PRE from IBE to CBE scheme. The main novelty for our scheme is allowing PKG generating re-encryption keys by using its master − key in its plain form, while all previous schemes just allowing PKG generating re-encryption keys by using its master − key in exponential form.
B. Organization
We organize our paper as following. In Section II, we propose the concept of hybrid PRE from IBE to CBE without key escrow and its security model. In Section III, we show how to construct such a scheme based on PRE from CBE to IBE in [10] . In Section IV, we review the concept of PRE from IBE to CBE and detail its security model. In Section V, we propose the first proxy re-encryption scheme from IBE to CBE and prove its security. In Section VI, we give our comparison results. We give our conclusions in Section VII.
II. HYBRID PRE FROM CBE TO IBE WITHOUT KEY ESCROW
Definition 1: Hybrid PRE from CBE to IBE consists of: 1)the three algorithms making up a CBE system KeyGen CBE , Enc CBE and Dec CBE 2)the four algorithms making up an IBE system SetUp IBE , KeyGen IBE , Enc IBE and Dec IBE 3)and three algorithms for re-encryption, which are 1) KeyGen P RO (sk, ID, mk). Given a CBE secret key sk, an IBE secret key sk ID for the IBE user ID, PKG's master − key mk, generate a re-encryption key rk which can re-encrypt CBE ciphertexts for pk into the IBE ciphertexts for ID. 2) ReEnc(rk, C pk , ID). Given the re-encryption key rk, a ciphertext C pk encrypted under the traditional public key, and ID, re-encrypt ciphertext C pk into C ID that can be decrypted by the IBE user ID. 3) Check(parms, C pk , pk). Given C pk and pk with parms, output 0 if C pk is a malformed ciphertext. Otherwise, output 1. Remark 1: Our definition is different from Matsuo's definition [10] about PRE from CBE to IBE. That is, we allow PKG generating re-encryption key directly by using its master − key mk while Matsuo's scheme only allow PKG helping the delegator and the delegatee generating re-encryption key indirectly. 
A. Security Model
In this section, we give our security models for PRE from CBE to IBE which based on [4] , [9] . Internal and External Security. Our security model protects users from two types of attacks: those launched from parties outside the system (External Security), and those launched from parties inside the system, such as the proxy, another partner, PKG, or some collusion between them (Internal Security). Generally speaking, internal adversaries are more powerful than external adversaries. And our scheme can achieve reasonable internal security. We just provide formalization of internal security notions.
Delegatee Security.
Because in PRE from CBE to IBE, PKG knows every IBE's normal secret key. So for every level 2 normal ciphertext, PKG can decrypt them and ciphertext generated by Enc IBE (ID, parms, M). Thus we only consider the case that proxy and delegator are colluding for level 2 ciphertext.
Definition 2:
is negligibly close to 1/2 for any PPT adversary A. In our notation, St is a state information maintained by A while (ID , sk ID ) is the target user's pubic and private key pair generated by the challenger which also chooses other keys for corrupt and honest parties. For other honest parties, keys are subscripted by h and we subscript corrupt keys by x. Oracles O renc proceeds as follows:
where C pki is the ciphertext under the public key pk i , pk i were produced by Keygen CBE , ID j were produced by Keygen IBE , this oracle responds with 'invalid' if C pki is not properly shaped w.r.t. pk i . Otherwise the re-encrypted first level ciphertext C ID = ReEnc(KeyGen P RO (sk i , ID j , mk, parms), ID j , parms, C pki ) is returned to A. Remark 3: The Re-encryption Oracle O renc can not give the adversary more help, because we consider the case the proxy and the delegator corrupted. When the proxy is corrupted, the adversary can do re-encryption himself. The reason why we do not delete the Reencryption Oracle O renc oracle in the above definition is that this makes our definition more general and consistent with other definitions in the literature [4] , [9] .
In PRE from CBE to IBE, the delegator certainly can decrypt the ciphertext which will be re-encrypted. Thus we consider only the case that proxy and PKG are colluding, We must point out this model is not considered in the current literature. The goal of solving the key escrow problem for PRE from CBE to IBE is just constructing a scheme which can resist the malicious PKG attack. But we consider a stronger model which can resist the the malicious PKG and proxy colluding attack.
is negligibly close to 1/2 for any PPT adversary A. The notations in this game are same as Definition 2 except the definition of Re-encryption Oracle O renc . In this game, any input makes O renc outputting C will be returned with ⊥.
Remark 4:
In this definition, we set two target users -pk , ID . The reason is that the target ciphertext can be seen as the ciphertext for ID and its second level ciphertext can be seen as the ciphertext for pk . In our definition, we consider the proxy being corrupted. That means, the proxy can know which second level ciphertext can be re-encrypted as the target first level ciphertext. Of course, if the proxy is not corrupted, and the proxy reencryption is untraceable, the security model can allow any delegator corrupting including pk . Delegator Security.
In PRE from CBE and IBE, the delegator is a CBE user. In this case, we consider the delegatee, proxy and PKG are all colluding.
Definition 4: (CBE-IND-CPA) A PRE scheme from CBE to IBE is CBE-IND-CPA secure if the probability
is negligibly close to 1/2 for any PPT adversary A. The notations in this game are same as Definition 2.
PKG Security.
In PRE from CBE and IBE, PKG's master − key can not leverage even if the delegator, the delegatee and proxy collude. We denote this security property as (PKG-OW).
III. A HYBRID PRE FROM CBE TO IBE WITHOUT KEY ESCROW SCHEME A. The Proposed Scheme
We construct our scheme based on the above PRE scheme. Our scheme shares the same underlying CBE scheme (ElGamal-type CBE scheme) as [10] scheme. The difference lies in the underlying IBE scheme and delegation scheme.
• The underlying IBE scheme (Variant of BB 1 IBE scheme): 1) SetUp IBE (k). Given a security parameter k, select a random generator g ∈ G and random elements
and parms = (g, g 1 , g 2 , h). Let mk be the master − key and let parms be the public parameters.
and ID with parms, pick a random
The delegatee chooses a collision resistent hash function H : {0, 1} 3|p| → Z * p and a random seed r ∈ Z * p , and computes k = H(pk, ID, r). The delegatee's private key is
• The underlying CBE scheme (ElGamal-type CBE scheme):
The public key is pk = (g 3 , g 4 , g 5 ). The secret random key is sk = (θ, β, δ).
2) Enc CBE (pk, parms, M ). Given pk = (g 3 , g 4 , g 5 ) and a message M with parms, pick a random r ∈ Z * p and compute C pk = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) = (g g 2 ) r ). 3) Dec CBE (sk, parms, C pk ). Given C pk = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) and the secret key sk = (θ, β, δ) with parms, compute M = C 4 /e(C 1/β 2 , g 2 ).
• The delegation scheme: 1) KeyGen P RO (sk, sk ID , mk, parms). On input (θ, β, δ) from the delegator and input (g u , k) from the delegatee, outputs the re-encryption key C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) , the re-encryption key rk pk→ID = (1/θ, g ku/β , 1/δ) and ID with parms, reencrypt the ciphertext C pk into C ID as following:
We verify correctness of our scheme. Following the Dec2 IBE (sk ID , parms, C ID ) algorithm, we get
In our scheme, every IBE user has a self generated private key k. It's this k that can make our scheme resist malicious PKG decrypting IBE user's reencrypted ciphertext.
B. Security Analysis
Theorem 1: Suppose the DBDH assumption holds, then our scheme is IBE-LV2-IND-sID-CPA secure for the proxy and delegator's colluding.
Proof: Suppose A can attack our scheme, we construct an algorithm B solves the DBDH problem in
abc and 0 otherwise. Let g 1 = g a , g 2 = g b , g 3 = g c . Algorithm B works by interacting with A in a selective identity game as follows: 1) Initialization. The selective identity game begins with A first outputting an identity ID that it intends to attack. 2) Setup. To generate the system's parameters, algorithm B picks α ∈ Z p at random and defines h = g −ID 1 g α . It gives A the parameters parms = (g, g 1 , g 2 , h ). Note that the corresponding master − key, which is unknown to B, is g
It gives A the public key pk i = (g i1 , g i2 , g i3 ).
3) Phase 1
• "A issues up to private key queries on Then we have that
• "A issues up to private key queries on pk i ". B returns (x i , y i , z i ).
• "A issues up to re-encryption key queries on (pk j , ID i )". The challenge B computes
y j , k /z j ) and returns it to A.
• "A issues up to re-encryption key queries on (pk j , ID )". The challenge B randomly choose a k ∈ Z p , and computes
where u is a randomly choose from Z * p and returns it to A.
• "A issues up to re-encryption queries on (C, pk j , ID i ) or (C, pk j , ID )" The challenge B runs ReEnc(rk pkj →IDi , C, pk j , ID i ) or ReEnc(rk pkj →ID , C, pk j , ID ) and returns the results. 4) Challenge When A decides that Phase1 is over, it outputs two messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ G. Algorithm B picks a random bit b and responds with the
, then C is a valid encryption of M b under ID . Otherwise, C is independent of b in the adversary's view. 5) Phase2 A issues queries as he does in Phase 1 excepts natural constraints. 6) Guess Finally, A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1}.
Algorithm B concludes its own game by outputting a guess as follows. If b = b , then B outputs 1 meaning T = e(g, g) abc .
Otherwise it outputs 0 meaning T = e(g, g)
abc .
When T = e(g, g) abc then A's advantage for breaking the scheme is same as B's advantage for solving DBDH problem.
Theorem 2: Our scheme is IBE-LV1-IND-ID-CPA secure for the proxy and PKG's colluding.
Proof: The security proof follows the security of symmetrical encryption. 1) Setup. To generate the system's parameters, the challenger B picks α ∈ Z p , it randomly choose x ∈ Z * q ,y ∈ Z * q and computes h = g
It gives parms = (g, g 1 , g 2 , h) to A.
2) Phase 1
• "A issues up to master-key query ". The challenger B returns (α, g α 2 ).
• "A issues up to private key queries on ID".
Given mk = g α 2 and ID with parms, pick a random u, k ∈ Z *
• "A issues up to private key queries on pk". B returns (θ, β, δ).
• "A issues up to rekey generation queries on (pk, ID)". The challenge B chooses randomly k ∈ Z * p and computes rk pk→ID = (k /θ, g k u/β , k /δ) and returns it to A.
• "A issues up to re-encryption queries on (C, pk, ID)". The challenge B runs ReEnc(rk pk→ID , C, pk, ID) and return the results. 3) Challenge When A decides that Phase1 is over, it outputs two messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ G and the attack identity ID , Algorithm B picks g u as the ID 's second item of its private key, he picks a random bit b and r, k ∈ Z * p responds with the ciphertext C = (g r , h r , e(g k u , g Thus the maximal probability of A successes is 1/p , which is negligible.
Theorem 3: Our scheme is CBE-IND-CPA secure for the proxy, PKG and delegatee's colluding except the case of the target CBE ciphertext has not been re-encrypted by the proxy.
Proof: In this case, the PKG and delegatee's colluding just likes [10] 's PRE scheme from CBE to IBE, the proof is the same as [10] .
Theorem 4: Our scheme is not CBE-IND-CPA secure for the proxy, PKG and delegatee's colluding in the case of the target CBE ciphertext has been re-encrypted by the proxy.
Proof: Suppose the target CBE ciphertext is C pk = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) which has been re-encrypted by proxy to be
, PKG can decrypt the ciphertext as following. Because C 1 = g r , he can compute w = g rα and gets the plaintext by computing
Theorem 5: Suppose the DBDH assumption holds, then our scheme is PKG-OW secure for all of the proxy, delegatee and delegator's colluding.
Proof: We just give the intuition for this theorem. When considering the proxy, delegatee and delegator's colluding, PKG only interacts with the delegatee-its IBE user. And we know the BB 1 identity based encryption is IND-sID-CPA secure under DBDH assumption. That's imply the attacker can not recover the PKG's master − key.
IV. HYBRID PRE FROM IBE TO CBE Definition 5: PRE from IBE to CBE consists of: 1)the four algorithms making up an IBE system SetUp IBE , KeyGen IBE , Enc IBE and Dec IBE 2)the three algorithms making up a CBE system KeyGen CBE , Enc CBE and Dec CBE 3)and three algorithms for re-encryption, which are 1) KeyGen P RO (sk ID , sk, pk, mk, parms). Given an IBE secret key sk ID for the IBE user ID, a CBE secret key sk, PKG's master − key mk with parms,pk, generate a re-encryption key rk which can re-encrypt the IBE ciphertexts for ID into CBE ciphertexts for pk. 2) ReEnc(rk, parms, C ID , pk). Given the re-encryption key rk, a ciphertext C ID encrypted under the identity ID, and pk with parms, re-encrypt ciphertext C ID for ID into C pk that can be decrypted by sk. 3) Check(parms, C ID , ID). Given C ID and ID with parms, output 0 if C ID is a malformed ciphertext. Otherwise, output 1.
A. Security Model
Delegator Security.
In PRE from IBE and CBE, the delegator is a IBE user. In this case, we consider the delegatee, proxy are colluding.
Definition 6: (IBE-IND-ID-CPA)
A PRE scheme from IBE to CBE is IBE-IND-ID-CPA secure if the probability
Delegatee Security.
In PRE from IBE and CBE, the delegatee is a CBE user. We consider the second level CBE ciphertext 4 . In 4 Second level ciphertext means the normal CBE ciphertext this case, we assume the delegator, proxy and PKG are colluding. Definition 7: (CBE-LV2-IND-CPA) A PRE scheme from IBE to CBE is CBE-LV2-IND-CPA secure for CBE if the probability
In PRE from IBE and CBE, the delegatee is a CBE user. We consider the first level CBE ciphertext 5 . In this case, we assume the proxy and PKG are colluding.
Definition 8: (CBE-LV1-IND-CPA) A PRE scheme from IBE to CBE is CBE-LV1-IND-CPA secure for CBE if the probability
is negligibly close to 1/2 for any PPT adversary A. The notations in this game are same as Definition 2. PKG Security.
In PRE from IBE to CBE, PKG's master − key can not leverage even if the delegator, the delegatee and proxy collude. We denote this security property as (PKG-OW).
V. A HYBRID PRE FROM IBE TO CBE SCHEME
The PRE scheme from IBE to CBE involves the ElGamal-type CBE scheme and the BB 1 IBE scheme.
• The underlying IBE scheme is the BB 1 scheme (the first scheme in [3] .) • The underlying CBE scheme (ElGamal-type CBE scheme): 1) KeyGen CBE (k, parms). Given a security parameter k , parms, pick a random θ ∈ Z *
The public key is pk = g 3 . The secret key is sk = (d 0 , d 1 ) = (θ, k).
2) Enc CBE (pk, parms, M ). Given pk = g 3 and a message M with parms, pick a random r ∈ Z * p and compute
Given a reencrypted ciphertext C pk = ( C 1 , C 2 ) and the secret key sk = (d 0 , d 1 ) = (θ, k) with
• The delegation scheme: 1) KeyGen P RO (sk ID , sk, pk, mk, parms). The PKG first chooses a collision resistent hash function H : {0, 1} 3|p| → Z * p and a random seed s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z * p , and computes k 1 = H(ID, pk, s 1 ), k 2 = H(ID, pk, s 2 ). The PKG computes ( 2 ) and sends it to the proxy. The delegatee sends kθ to the proxy. The proxy sets the re-encryption key rk ID→pk = (rk 1 , rk 2 ) = (
M e(g 1 , g 2 ) r ) and re-encryption key rk ID→pk = (rk 1 , rk 2 ), the proxy re-encrypt the ciphertext C ID into C pk as following. ( C 2 , g ). If v 1 = v 2 then output "Valid", otherwise output "Invalid". We can verify its correctness as the following A. Security Analysis Theorem 6: Suppose the mDBDH assumption holds, then our scheme is IBE-IND-sID-CPA secure for the proxy and delegatee's colluding.
Proof: We omit the proof here, interested readers can refer [12] to get the proof.
Theorem 7: Our scheme is CBE-LV2-IND-CPA and CBE-LV1-IND-CPA secure for the proxy, delegator and PKG's colluding.
Proof: We just give the intuition for this theorem. The security proof follows the principle of symmetrical encryption. The only information about CBE user's private key just relying on kθ. But even if the proxy, delegator and PKG are colluding, they can only get kθ where k blinding the private key θ perfectly. Thus they can only guess θ. The adversaries' success probability is at most 1/p which is negligible, whether for CBE first level ciphertext or for CBE second level ciphertext.
Theorem 8: Suppose the mDBDH assumption holds, then our scheme is PKG-OW secure for the proxy, delegatee and delegator's colluding.
Proof: We just give the intuition for this theorem. When considering the proxy, delegatee and delegator colluding, the PKG only interact with delegator and proxy. The re-encryption key rk = (
) where x is randomly choose from Z * p . That is to say, the adversaries can not get any information about α except randomly guessing. And we know the BB 1 identity based encryption is secure under DBDH assumption. That's imply the attacker can not recover the PKG's master − key. Thus our scheme is PKG-OW secure for the proxy, delegatee and delegator's colluding.
VI. COMPARISON
In this section, we give our comparison results with other hybrid proxy re-encryption schemes [10] . We compare our schemes with other schemes from two ways. First we concern about schemes' security, then we concern about schemes' efficiency.
Notations: In I we denote with/without random oracle as W/O RO, assumption as Assum, security model as SecMod, colluding attackers as Colluding, underlying IBE as UnderIBE, stand model as Std, , proxy as P, DGA as delegator, DGE as delegatee. P and DGA means that proxy colludes with delegator, P or DGA means that proxy or delegator is malicious adversary but they never collude. SymEnc-Sec means the security of symmetric encryption, CBE-ciph-no-re-encrypted means CBE ciphertext having not been re-encrypted, CBE-ciph-re-encrypted means the CBE ciphertext having been re-encrypted
In II, we denote encryption as Enc, re-encryption as Reenc, decryption as Dec, ciphertext as Ciph and ciphertext length as Ciph-Len, resisting malicious PKG attack as ReMal. t p , t e and t me represent the computational cost of a bilinear pairing, an exponentiation and a multiexponentiation respectively, while t s and t v represent the computational cost of a one-time signature signing and verification respectively. |G|, |Z q |, |G e | and |G T | denote the bit -length of an element in groups G, Z q , G e and G T respectively. Here G and Z q denote the groups used in our scheme, while G e and G T are the bilinear groups used in GA07, CT07, SXC08 schemes, i.e., the bilinear pairing is e : G e × G e → G T . Finally, |vk| and |s| denote the bit length of the one-time signature's public key and a one-time signature respectively.
From I and II, we can know that the security models of our PRE from CBE to IBE and PRE from IBE to CBE schemes are stronger than the security model of M07A scheme. Thus our schemes are more secure than M07A scheme. We construct the first PRE from CBE to IBE which can resist malicious PKG attack. But we note that our scheme needs to add one more secret key k to the delegatee.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we extend Matsuo's research on hybrid PRE. We propose the concept of hybrid PRE from CBE to IBE without key escrow, we try to detail its threat model and construct such a concrete scheme. Also we fulfill the security model for hybrid PRE from IBE to CBE and construct the first such scheme by requiring PKG using his master − key in plain form for generating re-encryption key. But we note that both of our scheme can only achieve IND-ID-CPA or IND-CPA secure, it is an interesting future work to construct hybrid PRE with chosen ciphertext security. It is also an interesting work to find more application for these schemes in emerging fields such as Personal Health Record protection.
